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Book Descriptions:

737 manual gear extension



The nose gear is 3.5” longer to relieve higher dynamic loads and the nosewheelwell has been extended 3” forward. There is an externally mounted trunnion bearing on the gear, a relocated gas charging valve, and the uplock link is separate from the reaction link. It is fitted with 43.5” tyres and digital antiskid. Weathercocking into any crosswind impinging on the fin; Torque reaction fromPressures vary with series, Unfortunately this large The table below should prove helpful, notice how the aquaplaning speeds are all Note Once aquaplaning has started, it will continue to a much lower speed. Instead the The first few 737s had The landing gear panel had a NOT SEALED They are both about 300kgs lighter than steel and last twice as long. The normal brake system and autobrakes are powered by hydraulic system B. If brake pressure drops below 1500psi, hydraulic system A automatically providesThe accumulator also provides pressure for the parking brake. Both brake pressures are indicated on The plugs melt to release tyre pressure at approx 177C 351F. Approximately 750psi is applied in 1.75 sec, then theThis is more difficult on the NGs because the feedback springs on the brake I would advise against the latter But the most common reason is that too much grease is put on the axle at wheel It could also be contamination from If this happens to you, give it a tap back inDont forget toThere is no prism, just a long tube. This viewer directs your eye exactly towardThe nosegear down marks are two red arrows pointing at each other. There is one. In the cockpit the pilot pulls the handle and the nosegear unlocks from its up position, then falling by gravity and in flight helped by the drag, it ends up in the down and locked position. This prevents any hydraulic pressure to go the the landing gears. So the landing gear lever may still be in up, the gear comes down pressureless. By continuing to use this site, you agree to the use of cookies.http://anbao.vn/uploads/userfiles/elk-ip232-manual.xml

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

For a better experience, we recommend using another browser. Learn more Facebook Email or phone Password Forgotten account. Sign Up See more of B737800 Home Cockpit on Facebook Log In or Create New Account See more of B737800 Home Cockpit on Facebook Log In Forgotten account. Detailed explanations and pictures can be found on the following linkThis manual gear door is provided with only an alu panel which is attached to the cockpit floor. I have omitted the compartment with handles under the floor. There are numerous ways in which this is done depending on the size and complexity of the aircraft. Some aircraft have an emergency release handle in the flight deck that is connected through a mechanical linkage to the gear uplocks. When the handle is operated, it releases the uplocks and allows the gear to freefall to the extended position under the force created by gravity acting upon the gear. Other aircraft use a nonmechanical backup, such as pneumatic power, to unlatch the gear. Activated from the flight deck, when the freefall valve is opened, hydraulic fluid is allowed to flow from the gearup side of the actuators to the geardown side of the actuators, independent of the power pack. Pressure holding the gear up is relieved, and the gear extends due to its weight. Air moving past the gear aids in the extension and helps push the gear into the downandlocked position. If the gear still fails to extend, some sort of unlatching device is used to release the uplocks and allow the gear to free fall. Force of some kind must therefore be applied. Manual extension systems, wherein the pilot mechanically cranks the gear into position, are common. Consult the aircraft maintenance manual for all emergency landing gear extension system descriptions of operation, performance standards, and emergency extension tests as required.http://www.galtex.sk/storage/file/elk-124-manual.xml



Each handle releases the gear uplock via a cable system so the gear can freefall into the extended position Share to Twitter Share to Facebook Share to Pinterest. Hydraulic system A can be turned of, bleeds too, gear lever can be in off position but how to extend gear. I had flight that had issue with nose gear but i was unable to extend it manually. Then you have to turn the crank several turns in one direction to unlock the gear. Once unlocked, the gear will free fall, which takes about 5 seconds. After that you have to lock the gear in the down position by turning the crank many turns in the opposite direction. Then you have to repeat this process for the remaining two gears. So it is a complicated and time consuming process. Who will fly the airplane in the mean time, when the autopilot is not availableWhould be great feature.See how this was modeled for example in the new version of Embraer 110 Bandeirante, just fantastic! I do not work for FlyJSim, although I was one of the many beta testers. All I tried to do was to point out how the real airplane works, since I did fly it as FE, FO and Capt.My take on it, in the best case, I would hope only to emergency gear extension, but not retraction after they got stuck alreadySo if there are no hydraulics it will fall down once you slow to 180kts on approach to land. This is the best solution for now till we get around to modeling the manual gear extension. I do not work for FlyJSim, although I was one of the many beta testers. All I tried to do was to point out how the real airplane works, since I did fly it as FE, FO and Capt.Does the plane IRL have an autodeploy if the nose points down for a brief moment or some other feature for the protection of the crew. I tried to find this issue in the forums but am at the early stages of my research. UP and down like 10 times in a 5 minute span of flying.

Could it be that something is not right with your installation or maybe a double assignment of a control functionThe only warning the crew gets is a horn which can be silenced when power is reduced to idle thrust, like when descending. Many FEs had to buy a lot of drinks when they were not quick enough to pull the horn cutout lever on the pedestal and the horn came on when the pilot pulled he throttles back. me included when I was FE So if there are no hydraulics it will fall down once you slow to 180kts on approach to land. This is the best solution for now till we get around to modeling the manual gear extension. I binded them and it worked perfectely. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.Paste as plain text instead Display as a link instead Clear editor Upload or insert images from URL.Do not use chat for extended support, only basic questions. To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser. You can download the paper by clicking the button above. Related Papers Aircraft Landing Gear Design Principles and Practices By neto araujo USAFF By Erdem Tunca Instructors Corner Airbus A320 English Version By Reinaldo M Del Fiaco Ace technical pilot interview By Cristian Bantis INSTRUCTORS CORNER MANUAL DE PADRONIZACAO E OPERACAO DE VOO SIMULADO AIRBUS A320 By Reinaldo M Del Fiaco READ PAPER Download pdf. PPRuNe Bashes Airline Specific Private Forums Thomson Airways bmi easyJet Monarch Southwest Airlines Pilots Thomas Cook Airlines Emirates NATS Flying Solo I am surprised that in the QRH, Manual gear extension NNC doesnt warn the crew that if the manual gear extension door is left open the NWS will be INOP, neither does the FCOM Why did Boeing do this, do they expect pilots to figure it out by themselves Thanks P.



http://afreecountry.com/?q=node/2947

S if any one could help me by giving answers to my previous thread, i would be grateful ive got zero replies Link given below It only redirects up pressure to the return lines to permit manual extension with the gear lever in any position unlike on the older 737s. The solenoid valve controls hydraulic pressure to a pressure operated bypass valve. When the bypass valve is in the bypass position, landing gear up pressure is ported around the slide valve to return. This prevents a hydraulic lock in the landing gear system if the slide valve jams.Might have to email the author and request explanationClosing it is a good idea in any case. Especially for the unlikely case when you want to retract your gear again As has been mentioned earlier, that door switch opens a port within the gear selector valve that prevents a hydraulic lock when manually lowering the gear. With that port open, no gear retraction possible. NWS pressure is supplied by gear down supply pressure, so that must be available on the ground, which it is via the gear being selected down!Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use. PPRuNe Bashes Airline Specific Private Forums Thomson Airways bmi easyJet Monarch Southwest Airlines Pilots Thomas Cook Airlines Emirates NATS Flying Solo If the access door is left in the open position, it is not possible to retract the landing gear. Yours bemusedly, CakovIf the manual extension access door is left open,the landing gear selector valve will be in the bypass position.If you select the gear up via the landing gear selector handle in the flight deck, hydraulic up pressure will be blocked at the selector and will not reach any of the retraction components.Hence the gear will stay down and locked. Regards DDG.The access door was not completely closed.Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.

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

We recommend you upgrade to a newer version of Internet Explorer or switch to a browser like Firefox or Chrome. In a light or general aviation aircraft, the use of hydraulic power may be limited to the application of wheel brakes only.Based on this hydraulic system criticality, many design features are incorporated to ensure reliability, redundancy and the ability to maintain control of the aircraft in the event of one or more failures. Often two or more hydraulic systems are built into the design of an aircraft. This power is transmitted by the hydraulic fluid through system specific hydraulic lines and used to drive the motors and actuators associated with that system. While hydraulic systems may be designed to exchange power under controlled conditions via a Power Transfer Unit PTU, there are very rarely provisions for any exchange of fluids incorporated into system designs.Depending upon the sophistication level of the aircraft warning systems in question, the failure could be presented to the crew by means of an EICAS or ECAM message, a Master Caution or Master Warning light, an annunciator panel fail light, a system warning light or by means of a pressure or quantity gauge indication. An aural warning may also be associated with the failure.These procedures and the associated protocols will include the immediate actions required to secure the emergency, limitations and system losses resulting from the failure and, when applicable, the appropriate configuration and performance penalties to be utilized for continuing the flight and subsequent landing. The consequences of multiple failures are taken into consideration where applicable. They should then consider the consequences of the failure and the associated impact on the continuation of the flight. In all cases, the primary pilot responsibility is to FLY THE AIRCRAFT.It may also result in the loss of the autopilot.

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Therefore, it is critical that the pilot flying PF maintain focus on the continued safe control of the aircraft. With multiple hydraulic system or component failures, control of the aircraft may be difficult. The extreme, but highly unlikely, case of a total loss of aircraft hydraulics could necessitate the nonstandard use of engine thrust to maintain aircraft control e.g. DC10, Sioux City, 1989 . If there are memory drills associated with the failure, they should be completed in a timely fashion. In a multicrew aircraft, memory items and the followon checklists and procedures will be completed by the pilot monitoring PM with confirmation of critical actions, when appropriate, from the PF, using challenge and response. Perform QRH, checklist or ECAM procedures as appropriate to the aircraft type. Actions that could be applicable to the situation includeWhile the crew may not have yet formulated their plan of action, advising ATC of the hydraulic problems will permit them to provide early assistance which may includeThe crew should ascertain the status of not only the hydraulic systems, but also any other aircraft systems that may have been affected by the failure. In many cases, a hydraulic failure will have an impact on approach and landing speeds, crosswind limits and landing distance required. Higher approach and landing speeds will be required if flight controls are degraded or if high lift devices cannot be extended due to the failure. Higher approach speeds will result in significantly longer than normal landing distances as landing distance is a function of mv 2. Landing distances will also be increased should the failure result in degradation of braking capability, loss of ground spoilers or the inability to deploy thrust reversers. Some hydraulic failures can result in the loss of the aircraft all weather capability due to loss of the autopilot, the resultant landing flap position or to degradation in flight control function.

If the hydraulic failure has resulted in the inability to retract the undercarriage, flaps or slats, a higher than normal rate of fuel consumption will result. It may also be necessary to operate at a lower than normal altitude, in which case minimum safe altitudes must be checked. In these cases, it is critical that flight crew fuel management takes the abnormal configuration or operating level into consideration. The crew must remain aware of the fuel state at all times. Use onboard information sources such as approach charts and the MEL plus external resources via ATS, ACARS or Company communications to compile airfield data, weather reports, runway condition and other information to be considered in the decision process. Request technical support as required. Develop a clear picture of the impact of the failure on the approach, landing and post landing operations. For exampleThe salient details of the plan should be transmitted to ATC and to Company Operations to enable coordination of any required support. ATC will need to knowThe flight proceeded to destination and carried out a daylight landing there in normal visibility without any further aircraft damage. Because of a further deterioration in the status of the aircraft hydraulic systems during the landing roll, the aircraft was stopped on the runway and then towed into the gate. No persons were injured in this incident. NIM, manoeuvring, northern North Sea UK, 1995 On 16 May 1995, an RAF BAe Nimrod on an airworthiness function flight caught fire after an electrical short circuit led indirectly to the No 4 engine starter turbine disc being liberated and breaching the No 2 fuel tank. It was concluded by the Investigation that the leaking fuel had then been ignited by either the electrical arcing or the heat of the adjacent engine. After the fire spread rapidly, the risk of structural break up led the commander to ditch the aircraft whilst it was still controllable.

This was successful and all seven occupants were rescued. B752, vicinity Keflavik Iceland, 2013 On 26 February 2013, the crew of a Boeing 752 temporarily lost full control of their aircraft on a night autoILS approach at Keflavik when an uncommanded roll occurred during flap deployment after an earlier partial loss of normal hydraulic system pressure. The origin of the upset was found to have been a latent fatigue failure of a roll spoiler component, the effect of which had only become significant in the absence of normal hydraulic pressure and had been initially masked by autopilot authority until this was exceeded during flap deployment. B752, London Gatwick, 2013 An announcement by the Captain of a fullyboarded Boeing 757200 about to depart which was intended to initiate a Precautionary Rapid Disembarkation due to smoke from a hydraulic leak was confusing and a partial emergency evacuation followed. The Investigation found that Cabin Crew only knew of this via the announcement and noted subsequent replacement of the applicable procedures by an improved version, although this was still considered to lack resilience in one respect. The event was considered to have illustrated the importance of having cabin crew close to doors when passengers are on board aircraft on the ground. CRJ1, Southampton UK, 2007 On 17 January 2007, a Bombardier CRJ 100 being operated by French airline Brit Air on a scheduled night passenger flight from Paris CDG to Southampton could not be directionally controlled after touchdown on a dry surface in normal visibility and almost calm winds and departed the side of the runway during the landing roll. This vibration was accompanied by lateral acceleration that made directional control difficult but the aircraft was kept on the runway and at a speed of 75 knots, the vibrations abruptly stopped. Once clear of the runway, the aircraft was stopped and the engines shutdown prior to a tow to the gate. None of the 133 occupants were injured.

B743, vicinity Tehran Mehrabad Iran, 2015 On 15 October 2015 a Boeing 747300 experienced significant vibration from one of the engines almost immediately after takeoff from Tehran Mehrabad. After the climb out was continued without reducing the affected engine thrust an uncontained failure followed 3 minutes later. The ejected debris caused the almost simultaneous failure of the No 4 engine, loss of multiple hydraulic systems and all the fuel from one wing tank. The Investigation attributed the vibration to the Operators continued use of the engine without relevant Airworthiness Directive action and the subsequent failure to continued operation of the engine after its onset. SW4, Mirabel Montreal Canada, 1998 On 18 June 1998, the crew of a Swearingen SA226 did not associate directional control difficulty and an extended take off ground run at Montreal with a malfunctioning brake unit. Subsequent evidence of hydraulic problems prompted a decision to return but when evidence of control difficulties and fire in the left engine followed, a single engine diversion to Mirabel was flown where, just before touchdown, the left wing failed upwards. All occupants were killed when the aircraft crashed inverted. The Investigation found that overheated brakes had caused an engine nacelle fire which spread and eventually caused the wing failure. A332, Karachi Pakistan, 2014 On 4 October 2014, the fracture of a hydraulic hose during an A330200 pushback at night at Karachi was followed by dense fumes in the form of hydraulic fluid mist filling the aircraft cabin and flight deck. After some delay, during which a delay in isolating the APU air bleed exacerbated the ingress of fumes, the aircraft was towed back onto stand and an emergency evacuation completed. During the return to stand, a PBE unit malfunctioned and caught fire when one of the cabin crew attempted to use it which prevented use of the exit adjacent to it for evacuation.

DC10, Sioux City USA, 1989 On 19 July 1989, a GE CF66Dpowered Douglas DC1010 at FL370 suffered a sudden explosive failure of the tailmounted number 2 engine and a complete loss of hydraulics so that the aircraft could only be controlled by varying thrust on the remaining two engines. With only limited flightpath control, the subsequent Sioux City emergency landing led to the destruction of the aircraft by impact and fire. The Investigation attributed the engine failure to nonidentification of a fan disc fatigue crack arising from a manufacturing defect and the loss of hydraulics to debris dispersal which had exceeded the system’s certification protection. B763, Warsaw Poland, 2011 On 1 November 2011, a Boeing 767300 landed at Warsaw with its landing gear retracted after declaring an emergency in anticipation of the possible consequences which in this event included an engine fire and a full but successful emergency evacuation. The Investigation attributed inability to achieve successful gear extension using either alternate system or free fall to crew failure to notice that the Battery Busbar CB which controlled power to the uplock release mechanism was tripped. Gear extension using the normal system had been precluded in advance by a partial hydraulic system failure soon after takeoff from New York. Two hydraulic circuits were lost immediately, followed shortly by the third hydraulic system. This was accompanied by a significant fuel leak from the left wing. Due to the total loss of hydraulics, both primary and secondary flight controls were lost; however, both engines were still running. The crew successfully used engine thrust to return the aircraft back to the departure airfield where a controlled landing was accomplished 25 minutes after the missile strike. The resultant explosive decompression severed the hydraulic lines and the aircraft progressively became uncontrollable.